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Abstract—In this paper, we present an operational system
for cyber threat intelligence gathering from various social plat-
forms on the Internet particularly sites on the darknet and
deepnet. We focus our attention to collecting information from
hacker forum discussions and marketplaces offering products and
services focusing on malicious hacking. We have developed an
operational system for obtaining information from these sites for
the purposes of identifying emerging cyber threats. Currently, this
system collects on average 305 high-quality cyber threat warnings
each week. These threat warnings include information on newly
developed malware and exploits that have not yet been deployed
in a cyber-attack. This provides a significant service to cyber-
defenders. The system is significantly augmented through the use
of various data mining and machine learning techniques. With
the use of machine learning models, we are able to recall 92%
of products in marketplaces and 80% of discussions on forums
relating to malicious hacking with high precision. We perform
preliminary analysis on the data collected, demonstrating its
application to aid a security expert for better threat analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pre-reconnaissance cyber threat intelligence refers to in-
formation gathered before a malicious party interacts with
the defended computer system. An example demonstrating the
importance of cyber threat intelligence is shown in Table 1.
A Microsoft Windows vulnerability was identified in Feb.
2015. The release of the vulnerability was essentially Microsoft
warning its customers of a security flaw. Note that at this time,
there was no publicly known method to leverage this flaw in a
cyber-attack (i.e. an available exploit). However, about a month
later an exploit was found to be on sale in darknet market. It
was not until July when FireEye, a major cybersecurity firm,
identified that the Dyre Banking Trojan designed to steal credit
cards exploited this vulnerability - the first time an exploit
was reported. This vignette demonstrates how threat warnings
gathered from the darknet can provide valuable information
for security professionals. The average global exposure of the
Dyre Banking Trojan was 57.3% along with another banking
malware Dridex1. It means that nearly 6 out of 10 organizations
in the world were affected, and this is a significantly high
number on a global level.
In this paper, we examine how such intelligence can be
gathered and analyzed from various social platforms on the In-
1https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2015/06/evolution of dridex.html
TABLE 1: Exploit example.
Timeline Event
Feb. 2015 Microsoft identifies Windows vulnerability MS15-
010/CVE 2015-0057 for remote code execution. There
was no publicly known exploit at the time the vulner-
ability was released.
April 2015 An exploit for MS15-010/CVE 2015-0057 was found
on a darknet market on sale for 48 BTC (around
$10,000-15,000).
July 2015 FireEye identified that the Dyre Banking Trojan, de-
signed to steal credit card number, actually exploited
this vulnerability1.
ternet particularly sites on the darknet and deepnet. In doing so,
we encounter several problems that we addressed with various
data mining techniques. Our current system is operational and
actively collecting approximately 305 cyber threats each week.
Table 2 shows the current database statistics. It shows the total
data collected and the data related to malicious hacking. The
vendor and user statistics cited only consider those individuals
associated in the discussion or sale of malicious hacking-
related material, as identified by the system. The data is
collected from two sources on the darknet/deepnet: markets
and forums.
TABLE 2: Current Database Status
Markets
Total Number 27
Total products 11991
Hacking related 1573
Vendors 434
Forums
Total Number 21
Topics/Posts 23780/162872
Hacking related 4423/31168
Users 5491
We are providing this information to cyber-security
professionals to support their strategic cyder-defense planning
to address questions such as, 1) What vendors and users
have a presence in multiple darknet/deepnet markets/ forums?
2)What zero-day exploits are being developed by malicious
hackers? 3) What vulnerabilities do the latest exploits target?
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Specific contributions of this paper include, 1) Description
of a system for cyber threat intelligence gathering from various
social platforms from the Internet such as deepnet and darknet
websites. 2) The implementation and evaluation of learning
models to separate relevant information from noise in the
data collected from these online platforms. 3) A series of
case studies showcasing various findings relating to malicious
hacker behavior resulting from the data collected by our
operational system.
Background: Many of the individuals behind cyber-operations
– originating outside of government run labs or military
commands – rely on a significant community of hackers.
They interact through a variety of online forums (as means
to both stay anonymous and to reach geographically dispersed
collaborators).
Darknet and Deepnet Sites: Widely used for underground
communication, “The Onion Router” (Tor) is free software
dedicated to protect the privacy of its users by obscuring
traffic analysis as a form of network surveillance [9]. The
network traffic in Tor is guided through a number of volunteer-
operated servers (also called “nodes”). Each node of the
network encrypts the information it blindly passes on neither
registering where the traffic came from nor where it is headed
[9], disallowing any tracking. Effectively, this allows not
only for anonymized browsing (the IP-address revealed will
only be that of the last node), but also for circumvention
of censorship2. Here, we will use “darknet” to denote the
anonymous communication provided by crypto-networks like
“Tor”, which stands in contrast to “deepnet” which commonly
refers to websites hosted on the open portion of the Internet
(the “Clearnet”), but not indexed by search engines [15].
Markets: Users advertise and sell their wares on marketplaces.
Darknet marketplaces provide a new avenue to gather infor-
mation about the cyber threat landscape. The marketplaces
sell goods and services relating to malicious hacking, drugs,
pornography, weapons and software services. Only a small
fraction of products (13% in our collected data to date) are
related to malicious hacking. Vendors often advertise their
products on forums to attract attention towards their goods
and services.
Forums. Forums are user-oriented platforms that have the
sole purpose of enabling communication. It provides the op-
portunity for the emergence of a community of like-minded
individuals - regardless of their geophysical location. Admin-
istrators set up Darknet forums with communication safety
for their members in mind. While structure and organization
of Darknet-hosted forums might be very similar to more
familiar web-forums, the topics and concerns of the users
vary distinctly. Forums addressing malicious hackers feature
discussions on programming, hacking, and cyber-security.
Threads are dedicated to security concerns like privacy and
online-safety - topics which plug back into and determine the
structures and usage of the platforms.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Fig. 1 gives the overview of the system. Through search
engines and spider services on the Tor network, human analysts
2See the Tor Project’s official website (https://www.torproject.org/)
were able to find forums and marketplaces populated by
malicious hackers. Other platforms were discovered through
links posted on forums either on the Tor-network or on the
Clearnet. The system consists of three main modules built
independently before integration. The system is currently fully
integrated and actively collecting cyber threat intelligence.
Crawler: The crawler is a program designed to traverse the
website and retrieve HTML documents. Topic based crawlers
have been used for focused crawling where only webpages of
interest are retrieved [17], [6]. More recently, focused crawling
was employed to collect forum discussions from darknet [10].
We have designed separate crawlers for different platforms
(markets/forums) identified by experts due to the structural
difference and access control measures for each platform. In
our crawler, we address design challenges like accessibility,
unresponsive server, repeating links creating a loop etc. to
gather information regarding products from markets and dis-
cussions on forums.
Parser: We designed a parser to extract specific information
from marketplaces (regarding sale of malware/exploits) and
hacker forums (discussion regarding services and threats).
This well-structured information is stored in a relational
database. We maintain two databases, one for marketplaces
and the other for forums. Like the crawler, each platform
has its own parser. The parser also communicates with
the crawler from time to time for collection of temporal
data. The parser communicates a list of relevant webpages
to the crawler, which are re-crawled to get time-varying
data. For markets we collect the following important prod-
ucts fields: {item title, item description, vendor name, ship-
ping details, item reviews, items sold, CVE, items left, trans-
action details, ratings}. For forums we collect the following
fields: {topic content, post content, topic author, post author,
author status, reputation, topic interest}.
Classifier: We employ a machine learning technique using an
expert-labeled dataset to detect relevant products and topics
from marketplaces and forums respectively discussed in Sec-
tion III. These classifiers are integrated into the parser to filter
out products and topics relating to drugs, weapons, etc. not
relevant to malicious hacking.
III. EVALUATION
We consider the classification of identifying relevant prod-
ucts in darknet/deepnet marketplaces and relevant topics on
forum post containing communication relevant to malicious
hacking in this paper. It is a binary classification problem
with the data sample (in this case products/forum topics)
being relevant or not. We look at both supervised and semi-
supervised approaches to address the classification.
A. Machine Learning Approaches
In this work, we leverage a combination of supervised
and semi-supervised methods. Supervised methods include
the well-known classification techniques of Naive Bayes
(NB), random forest (RF), support vector machine (SVM)
and logistic regression (LOG-REG). However, supervised
techniques required labeled data, and this is expensive and
often requires expert knowledge. Semi-supervised approaches
work with limited labeled data by leveraging information
from unlabeled data. We discuss popular semi-supervised
Fig. 1: System overview
approaches used in this work. We perform a grid search to
find optimal parameters for the learning techniques.
Label propagation (LP). The label propagation approach
[22] has been widely used for semi-supervised classification
task [3], [16], [21], [8]. It estimates the label values based
on graph Laplacian [1] where the model is represented by a
weighted graph G = (V,E) , where V indicates the vertices
representing the samples, while the edges E are the weights
indicating the similarity between points. A subset of these
vertices are labeled and these vertices are then used to estimate
the labels of the remaining under the assumption that the edges
are able to capture the similarity between samples. Hence,
the performance of these methods depends on the similarity
measure used. The most commonly used similarity measures
include k-NN and Gaussian kernel.
Co-training (CT). The Co-training approach was proposed
by Blum and Mitchell [4]. In this approach, the feature set is
divided into two sets (assumed to be independent), and two
classifiers are trained using the limited labeled set denoted by
L . These trained classifiers are then used to estimate the labels
for the unlabeled points. High confidence label estimates from
classifier-1 are added to the labeled set L of classifier-2 and
vice versa. For the current setting we set the confidence to
70%. Every time the labeled set L is updated, the classifiers
are retrained. This procedure repeats until all of the unlabeled
points are labeled. It can be viewed as two classifiers teaching
each other.
B. Experiments: Marketplaces
Marketplaces sell goods and services that do not relate to
malicious hacking, including drugs, pornography, weapons and
software services. Only a small fraction of products (13%)
are related to malicious hacking. We thus require a model
that can separate relevant products from the non-relevant ones.
The data collected from marketplaces is noisy and hence not
suitable to use directly as input to a learning model. Hence,
the raw information undergoes several steps of automated data
cleaning. We now discuss the challenges associated with the
dataset obtained and the data processing steps taken to address
them. We note that similar challenges occur for forum data.
Text Cleaning. Product title and descriptions on marketplaces
often have much text that serves as noise to the classifier
(e.g. *****SALE*****). To deal with these instances, we first
removed all non-alphanumeric characters from the title and
description. This, in tandem with standard stop-word removal,
greatly improved classification performance.
Misspellings and Word Variations. Misspellings frequently
occur on forums and marketplaces, which is an obstacle for the
standard bag-of-words classification approach. Additionally,
with the standard bag-of-words approach, variations of words
are considered separately (e.g. hacker, hack, hackers, etc.).
Word stemming mitigates these issue of word variations, but
fails to fix the issue of misspellings. To address this we use
character n-gram features. As an example of character n-gram
features, consider the word “hacker”. If we were using tri-gram
character features, the word “hacker” would yield the features
“hac”, “ack”, “cke”, “ker”. The benefit of this being that the
variations or misspellings of the word in the forms “hack”,
“hackz”, “”hackker”, will all have some common features.
We found that using character n-grams in the range (3, 7)
outperformed word stemming in our experiments.
Large Feature Space. In standard bag-of-words approach, as
opposed to the character n-gram approach, the feature matrix
gets very large as the number of words increase. As the number
of unique words grow, this bloated feature matrix begins to
greatly degrade performance. Using n-gram features further
increases the already over-sized feature matrix. To address
this issue, we leveraged the sparse matrix data structure in
the scipy3 library, which leverages the fact that most of the
entries will be zero. If a word or n-gram feature is not present
in a given sample, there is simply no entry for that feature in
the sparse matrix.
Preserving Title Feature Context. As the title and description
of the product are disjoint, we found that simply concatenating
the description to the product title before extracting features
led to sub-optimal classification performance. We believe that
by doing a simple concatenation, we were losing important
contextual information. There are features that should be
interpreted differently should they appear in the title versus the
description. Initially, we used two separate classifiers: one for
the title and one for the description. With this construction,
when an unknown product was being classified, we would
pass the title to the title classifier and the description to the
description classifier. If either classifier returned a positive
classification, we would assign the product a positive classifi-
cation. However, we believe that this again led to the loss of
important contextual information. To fix this, we independently
extract character n-gram features from the title and description.
3http://www.scipy.org/
TABLE 3: Markets and Number of products collected.
Markets Products
Market-1 439
Market-2 1329
Market-3 455
Market-4 4018
Market-5 876
Markets Products
Market-6 497
Market-7 491
Market-8 764
Market-9 2014
Market-10 600
This step yields a title feature vector and a description feature
vector. We then horizontally concatenate these vectors, forming
a single feature vector which includes separate feature sets for
the title and description.
Results: We consider 10 marketplaces to train and test our
learning model. A summary of these marketplaces is shown
in Table 3. Table 4 gives an instance of products defined as
being relevant or not. With the help of security experts we label
25% of the products from each marketplace. The experimental
setup is as follows. We perform a leave-one-marketplace-out
cross-validation. In other words, given n marketplaces we
train on n − 1 and test on the remaining one. We repeat
this experiment for all the marketplaces. For the supervised
experiment, we only use the 25% labeled data from each
marketplace. We evaluate the performance based primarily
on three metrics: precision, recall and unbiased F1. Precision
indicates the fraction of products that were relevant from the
predicted ones. Recall is the fraction of relevant products
retrieved. F1 is the harmonic mean of precision and recall.
The results are averaged and weighted by the number of
samples in each market. In this application, a high recall is
desirable as we do not want to omit relevant products. In the
supervised approaches, SVM with linear kernel performed the
best, recalling 87% of the relevant products while maintaining
a precision of 85% (Fig. 2). SVM performed the best likely due
to the fact it maximizes generality as opposed to minimizing
error.
TABLE 4: Example of Products.
Product Title Relevant
20+ Hacking Tools (Botnets Keyloggers Worms and More!) YES
5 gm Colombian Cocaine NO
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Precision Recall F1
A
ve
ra
ge
NB LOG-REG RF SVM
Fig. 2: Average Precision, Recall and F1 comparisons for NB, LOG-REG, RF and SVM
for product classification.
As stated, only 25% of the data is labeled, as labeling
often requires expert knowledge. However, this significant cost
and time investment can be reduced by applying a semi-
supervised approach which leverages the unlabeled data to
aid in classification. It takes approximately one minute for a
human to label 5 marketplace products or 2 topics on forums as
relevant or not, highlighting the costliness of manual labeling.
The experimental setup is similar to the supervised approach,
but this time we also utilize the large unlabeled data from each
marketplace (75%) for training.
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Fig. 3: Average Precision, Recall and F1 comparisons for LP, CT-NB, CT-LOG-REG,
CT-RF and CT-SVM for product classification.
Fig. 3 shows the performance comparison for the semi-
supervised approaches. For the co-training approach, we divide
the feature space into two sets. The two feature sets used are
both based on character n-grams. However, the set of words
from which the character n-grams are derived are disjoint
between the two sets. In this way, the two corresponding
feature vectors can be treated as being independent from
one another. Hence we get two views of the same sample.
Co-training with Linear SVM is able to recall 92% of the
relevant products as compared to label propagation and other
variants of co-training while maintaining a precision of 82%,
which is desirable. In this case, the unlabeled data aided
the classification in improving the recall to 92% without
significantly reducing the precision.
C. Experiment: Forums
In addition to the darknet/deepnet marketplaces that we
have already discussed, there are also numerous darknet fo-
rums on which users discuss malicious hacking related topics.
Again, there is the issue that only a fraction of these topics with
posts on these forums contain information that is relevant to
malicious hacking or the trading of exploits. Hence, we need a
classifier to identify relevant topics. This classification problem
is very similar to the product classification problem previously
discussed, with similar set of challenges.
We performed evaluation on two such English forums.
The dataset consisted of 781 topics with 5373 posts. Table 5
gives instance of topics defined as being relevant or not.
We label 25% of the topics and perform a 10-fold cross
validation using supervised methods. We show the results
from the top two performing supervised and semi-supervised
methods. In the supervised setting, LOG-REG performed the
best with 80% precision and 68% recall (Fig. 4). On the other
hand, leveraging unlabeled data in a semi-supervised technique
improved the recall while maintaining the precision. We note
that in this case the 10-fold cross validation was performed
only on the labeled points. In the semi-supervised domain
co-training with LOG-REG improved the recall to 80% with
precision of 78%.
TABLE 5: Example of Topics.
Topic Relevant
Bitcoin Mixing services YES
Looking for MDE/MDEA shipped to Aus NO
0.5
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LOG-REG SVM CT-LOG-REG CT-SVM
Fig. 4: Average Precision, Recall and F1 comparisons for LOG-REG, SVM, CT-LOG-
REG, and CT-SVM for English forum topic classification.
IV. CASE STUDIES
We analyze the data with the purpose of answering the
questions raised in the Section I. We will be using the fol-
lowing key security terms. Vulnerability is a security flaw that
allows an attacker to compromise a software or an operating
system. Exploit is a piece of software that takes advantage of
a vulnerability in a piece of software or operating system to
compromise it. Patch is a piece of software used to improve
existing software by fixing vulnerabilities to improve security.
We discuss the following case-studies.
A. Discovery of Zero-Day Exploits.
Over a 4 week period, we detected 16 zero-day exploits
from the marketplace data. Zero-day exploits leverage vul-
nerabilities that are unknown to the vendor. Table 6 shows a
sample of zero-day exploits with their selling price in Bitcoin.
The Android WebView zero-day affects a vulnerability in the
rendering of web pages in Android devices. It affects devices
running on Android 4.3 Jelly Bean or earlier versions of the
operating system. This comprised of more than 60% of the
Android devices in 2015. After the original posting of this
zero-day, a patch was released in Android KitKit 4.4 and
Lollipop 5.0 which required devices to upgrade their operating
system. As not all users have/will update to the new operating
system, the exploit continues to be sold for a high price.
Detection of these zero-day exploits at an earlier stage can help
organizations avoid an attack on their system or minimize the
damage. For instance, in this case, an organization may decide
to prioritize patching, updating, or replacing certain systems
using the Android operating system.
B. Users having presence in markets/ forums.
Previous studies on darknet crawling [10], [2] explore a
single domain, namely forums. We create a social network
that includes both types of information studied in this paper:
marketplaces and forums. We can thus study and find these
TABLE 6: Example of Zero-day exploits.
Zero-day exploit Price (BTC)
Internet Explorer 11 Remote Code Execution 0day 20.4676
Android WebView 0day RCE 40.8956
cross-site connections that were previously unstudied. We are
able to produce this connected graph using the “usernames”
used by vendors and users in each domain. A subgraph of
this network containing some of the individuals who are
simultaneously selling products related to malicious hacking
and publishing in hacking related forums is shown in Fig. 5.
In most cases, the vendors are trying to advertise/discuss their
products on the forums, demonstrating their expertise. Using
these integrated graphic representations, one can visualize
the individuals’ participation in both domains, making the
right associations that lead to a better comprehension of the
malicious hacker networks. It is helpful in determining social
groups within the forums of user interaction. The presence
of users on multiple markets and forums follows a power law.
From Fig. 6, majority of users only belong to a single market or
forum. We note that there are 751 users that are present in more
than two platforms. Fig. 7 considers one such user/vendor. The
vendor is active in 7 marketplaces and 1 forum . The vendor
offers 82 malicious hacking related products and discusses
these products on the forum. The vendor has an average rating
of 4.7/5.0, rated by customers on the marketplace with more
than 7000 successful transactions, indicating the reliability of
the products and the popularity of the vendor.
Fig. 5: Vendor/User network in marketplace and forum.
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Fig. 6: Users in multiple markets and
forums.
Fig. 7: A centric network of a Vendor.
V. RELATED WORK
Web crawling is a popular way of collecting large amounts
of data from the Internet. In many applications, researchers
are interested in specific topics for their application. Hence,
the need for a topic-based crawler popularly referred to as
a focused crawler [6], [5]. Most of the focused crawlers are
designed to collect information from the surface web with
little concentration on the darknet websites. More recently,
a focused crawler concentrating on dark web forums was
designed [10]. This research primarily concentrated on forums,
collecting data over a period of time and then performing
static analysis to study online communities. The authors also
describe different data mining techniques for these forums
in [7]. We, on the other hand, not only look at darknet forums
but also collect information from marketplaces hosting a range
of products relating to malicious hacking. Another application
of leveraging darknet information to counter human trafficking
is developed by DARPA through the Memex program4 - a
program with different goals than the work described in this
paper.
Previous work leverages the exploit information from
marketplaces in a game theoretic framework to formulate
system configurations that minimize the potential damage of
a malicious cyber attack [19]. Work analyzing hacker forums
to detect threats that pose great risk to individuals, businesses,
and government have been discussed in [2]. It further states
that knowledge is distributed in forums. That minimally skilled
people could learn enough by simply frequenting such plat-
forms. Studying these hacker communities gives insights in
the social relationships. Also, the distribution of information
amongst users in these communities based on their skill level
and reputation [13], [14], [11]. These forums also serve as mar-
kets where malware and stolen personal information are shared
/ sold [12]. Samtani et al. analyze hacker assets in underground
forums [20]. They discuss the dynamics and nature of sharing
of tutorials, source code, and “attachments” (e.g. e-books,
system security tools, hardware/software). Tutorials appear to
be the most common way of sharing resources for malicious
attacks. Source code found on these particular forums was
not related to specific attacks. Additionally underground (not
malicious hacking related) forums have also been analyzed
to captures the dynamic trust relationships forged between
mutually distrustful parties [18].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we implement a system for intelligence
gathering related to malicious hacking. Our system is currently
operational. We are in the process of transitioning this system
to a commercial partner. We consider social platforms on
darknet and deepnet for data collection. We address various
design challenges to develop a focused crawler using data
mining and machine learning techniques. The constructed
database is made available to security professionals in order
to identify emerging cyber-threats and capabilities.
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